This paper aims at participating in the long-lasting debate about the analytical foundations of the Cournot equilibrium. In a homogeneous oligopoly, under standard regularity conditions, we prove that Cournot-Nash emerges both under (i) price competition and Cournot conjectures; and (ii) supply function competition with ex post market clearing. We demonstrate both results within a model of exogenous product di¤erentiation.
Introduction
One of the key aspects of the debate around Cournot and Bertrand models lies in the widespread opinion according to which the former model needs an auctioneer. 1 The auctioneer, indeed, might represent the answer to the central question arising under quantity competition in oligopoly about what mechanism is the market price established. Hence, in modelling homogeneous oligopolies, one seems facing a dilemma which is well summarised by Friedman (1977, p. 39): "one is faced with a choice between Cournot's version in which …rms use the 'wrong'variable and the model behaves reasonably, and Bertrand's version in which …rms use the 'correct' variable and the model behaves absurdly".
In an in ‡uential paper, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have proposed a way out from the impasse. They show that a capacity-constrained pricesetting game yields the Cournot equilibrium. However, for a subset of admissible capacity levels, the use of mixed strategies at the price subgame is required. Moreno and Ubeda (2006) circumvent this di¢ culty by using the notion of reservation price to de…ne a …rm's supply curve as best reply to the rivals'aggregate supply, in such a way that a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists and coincides with Cournot.
In this paper we show that the Cournot equilibrium may result from either (i) Bertrand competition coupled with Cournot-Nash conjectures, or (ii) supply function competition with ex post market clearing. As for (i), we use the same approach as in Novshek (1980) and rely on the invertibility of the demand function, which, coupled with the Cournot-Nash conjecture (whereby the e¤ects on price of a change in individual and aggregate output coincide), implies the attainment of the Cournot outcome at equilibrium. As for (ii), we assume …rms compete in supply functions as in Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and the related growing literature, 2 except that we do not impose market clearing before …rms solve for the Nash equilibrium, but after. We show that the resulting equilibrium coincides with Cournot. We prove both results with homogeneous as well as (exogenously) di¤erentiated Bolle (1992) and Gilbert and Newbery (1992) are among the …rst to apply supply function competition to wholesale electricity markets. products 3 relying on single-stage games generating pure-strategy equilibria only. Our approach looks then simpler than that requiring an upstream stage modelling the choice of capacity, followed by either price competition (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983) or supply competition based on reservation prices (Moreno and Ubeda, 2006) .
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we set up a general model of homogeneous oligopoly and prove the Kreps and Scheinkman result in a simple single-stage price game. In section 3, we investigate the supply function equilibrium. Under the standard ex ante market clearing condition, we rank such equilibrium between Bertrand and Cournot in a simpler way than Klemperer and Meyer (1989) . Moreover, we establish there our central result: competition in supplty functions under ex post market clearing yields the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In section 4, we use Singh and Vives's (1984) model to extend our main results to di¤erentiated oligopoly. Section 5 concludes.
Price competition with Cournot conjectures
We consider an oligopolistic market where a population of single-product …rms N = f1; 2; 3; :::; n 1; ng produces a homogeneous good whose inverse demand function is p (Q) ; where p is price and Q is total output. We assume that p (Q) is invertible for all Q 0, with
Production entails a cost function C i (q i ) > 0 for all q i > 0; with the following properties for all i:
The individual pro…t function of …rm i is then
Competition in output levels yields the well known Novshek (1980) …rst order condition (FOC):
which, using the Cournot-Nash conjecture whereby p 0 (Q) = @p (Q) =@q i ; can be rewritten as follows:
On the other hand, if …rms compete in prices, the expression of individual pro…ts becomes i = pq i (p) C i (q i (p)). Accordingly, the e¤ect of a variation in price on …rm i's pro…ts is described by
Now, observe that solving (2) w.r.t. q i ; one obtains:
which implicitly identi…es the unique optimal quantity in the Cournot model. Let's go back to (3). For a moment, suppose …rms sell di¤erentiated varieties, in such a way that …rm i's demand function is q i (p i ; p i ) ; where p i is the vector of the n 1 prices of i's rivals. Assume that
for all j 6 = i, i.e., the direct e¤ect prevails on the cross e¤ect. The pro…t function of …rm i is
and the relevant FOC is
where
To come back to the homogeneous good case, one has to take the limit of (6-7), and consider that, as varieties become identical, the price is unique. Hence, (7) becomes:
with
Seen with the eyes of a Cournot player, q 0 i (p) is the inverse of p 0 (Q) = @p=@q i ; which measures the e¤ect on price of an output variation along the demand curve. Therefore, since
; we obtain:
while
We may therefore claim:
, the invertibility of the demand function and Cournot-Nash conjectures yield @ i =@p = 0 in correspondence of the Cournot-Nash output level.
The claim in Lemma 1 can be interpreted as follows. Jointly, (9-10) show two related facts:
If a …rm calculates the impact of a change in price on its pro…ts and then adopts the Cournot-Nash conjecture, then the …rst derivative of i w.r.t. market price is nil in correspondence of the optimal output implicitly identi…ed by (1) in the Cournot game. That is, imposing @ i =@p = 0 and solving for q i in the Bertrand game yields the Cournot outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , as long as the interplay between price and individual output is evaluated along the demand function. In turn, referring to the capacity-building game examined by Kreps and Scheinkman, this amounts to saying that if …rms look for the output level at which they should stop accumulating capacity, they may just examine the e¤ect of a variation of price on individual pro…ts, impose Cournot conjectures and nullify the relevant derivative.
When price equals marginal cost, the …rst derivative of the pro…t function w.r.t. price is not vanishing. This involves marginal cost pricing being a corner solution, Pareto-ine¢ cient for …rms, as they would like to escape from it by shrinking output levels and raising market price.
Supply function competition
Let us now consider competition in supply functions. Following Klemperer and Meyer (1989), we de…ne the supply function of …rm i as S i (p) ; with S 0 i (p) > 0 and S 00 i (p) 0 for all i = 1; 2; 3; :::; n; so that the pro…t function becomes i = pS i (p) C i (S i (p)) : Then, assuming that there is a unique market clearing price and imposing the market clearing condition according to which total demand D (p) must equal industry supply S (p) = P n i=1 S i (p), …rm i's maximization problem can be written as
where S i (p) P j6 =i S j (p) and the resulting FOC
in which q i D (p) S i at the market-clearing price (cf. Klemperer and Meyer, 1989, p. 1248) . In order to carry out a comparison of the di¤er-ent equilibria, we can consider the situation where all …rms are symmetric, whereby
Compare …rst Cournot and supply function competition and plug q into the r.h.s. of (12) to obtain
at the market-clearing price. For competition in supply function to yield higher output and lower pro…ts than Cournot competition, (14) must be positive (recall that under supply function equilibria the FOC is taken on price). Indeed, so it is, since
The comparison between Bertrand and supply function equilibria is straightforward, since at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium marginal cost pricing obtains and consequently (3) reduces to @ i =@p = q > 0 for any q including that implicitly identi…ed by (13) . Hence, the Bertrand equilibrium delivers higher output and lower pro…ts than supply function competition.
The foregoing analysis amounts to a di¤erent, arguably simpler, proof of a result already attained by Klemperer and Meyer (1989, pp. 1258-60): Proposition 2 Under assumptions [i-vi], the individual and industry output and price emerging at the supply function equilibrium are intermediate between those generated by price and quantity competition. Now, still assuming that a unique market clearing price exists, we examine what happens under supply function competition without imposing the market clearing condition ex ante. To do so, we introduce the concept of notional price b p = f (S i (p) ; S i (p)) ; which is the price that all …rms expect to prevail as a function of the vector of their supplies, in such a way that in the unique equilibrium their expectation must be con…rmed and the notional price and the market clearing price coincide. As a consequence, …rm i's maximisation problem becomes
In order to impose market clearing ex post, we require b p ( ) = p. This, together with symmetry across …rms, allows us to rewrite (16) as follows:
The last step amounts to noticing that, at equilibrium, p 0 S 0 = 1 and therefore the solution to the above equation is
which coincides with the Cournot equilibrium price p = [C 0 (q) q 0 q] =q 0 as S = q at the market clearing price.
The above discussion proves our central result:
Proposition 3 Under assumptions [i-vi], imposing ex post market clearing under supply function competition yields the Cournot equilibrium.
There is an interesting implication of the above result as for the longstanding debate initiated by Bertrand's critique to the Cournot assumption of …rms setting quantities, and the seeming lack of an auctioneer. The core issue is not the need of a third agent (other than …rms or consumers) in charge of setting the price, but rather whether …rms impose market clearing before or after taking FOCs w.r.t. the relevant market variable.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 jointly imply:
Corollary 4 Under Cournot-Nash conjectures, both Bertrand competition and supply function competition (with ex post market claering) collapse into the Cournot equilibrium.
Product di¤erentiation in oligopoly
In this section, we illustrate the extension of the above results when product di¤erentiation enters the picture. To this end, we use the di¤erentiated oligopoly version of the duopoly model introduced by Singh and Vives (1984) . The utility function of the representative consumer is
where a > 0 and parameter 2 (0; 1] measures the degree of product substitutability, i.e., is an inverse measure of product di¤erentiation. When = 1; the product is homogeneous. 4 The direct demand functions resulting from the constrained maximisation problem are:
:::; n:
(20) System (20) can be inverted to yield the demand system needed to model Cournot competition:
q j 8 i = 1; 2; :::; n:
Note that (20) satis…es the properties in (5).
On the supply side, all single-product …rms operate with the same technology summarised by the convex cost function C i = cq 2 i =2; i = 1; 2; :::; n, with c > 0:
We set out with Cournot competition. The problem of …rm i is
The optimal individual output in the symmetric Cournot-Nash (CN ) equilibrium is
the corresponding price is
and pro…ts are
4 If = 0, the two varieties do not interact and …rms are separate monopolists. We also disregard the range 2 [ 1; 0) ; where products are complements.
Under price competition, the relevant demand system is (20). BertrandNash (BN ) equilibrium magnitudes are:
We now consider competition in supply functions. We con…ne our attention to the case of linear supply functions, adopting the procedure suggested by Ciarreta and Gutierrez-Hita (2006) . The supply function of …rm i writes S i = i p i ; and the ex ante market clearing condition is S i = q i for all i = 1; 2; :::; n; where q i is de…ned as in (20). The presence of n varieties requires imposing n market-clearing conditions, one for each variety. Consider the individual demand function de…ned in (20). Whenever q i > 0; market clearing requires i p i = q i :
Solving the system of n equations de…ned by (29) delivers the market-clearing price for each variety i = 1; 2; :::; n:
where, to simplify the exposition, we have set P j6 =i j = (n 1) j . The pro…t function of …rm i is de…ned as
where p i is (30). Maximising i w.r.t. i and solving the resulting FOC under the symmetry condition j = i delivers:
where superscript SF mnemonics for supply function and subscript ea stands for ex ante. Note that SF ea 2 R + for all n 2. The equilibrium supply function is:
Using the above expression one can easily obtain the corresponding equilibrium pro…ts SF ea . We now turn to ex post market clearing. Not to impose the ex ante market clearing condition (29) entails substituting q i = i p i into the individual pro…t function, which therefore becomes:
Taking the FOC on i and imposing symmetry across 's (but not yet across prices), one obtains the equilibrium level of the slope of the supply function:
where p i is the vector of the prices set by the n 1 rivals of …rm i. Imposing now symmetry across prices entails that = a= [2 + c + (n 1)] ; and solving the ex post market clearing condition
we obtain
where subscript ep mnemonics for ex post market clearing. Now we can simplify all of the relevant equilibrium expressions, which can be written as follows:
and it is apparent that p 
If the anticipation, generating (39), is plugged into the inverse demand function (21), the latter rewrites as 
The remaining equilibrium magnitudes con…rm the coincidence between this equilibrium outcome and the Cournot-Nash one.
Concluding remarks
What we have shown is that the Cournot equilibrium can be reached along three alternative routes. The …rst and obvious is the game in the output space, by the book. The remaining two emerge from settings which are seemingly more competitive, wherein …rms must be explicitly concerned with the equilibrium levels of price(s), something they are not required to do in the Cournot model without an auctioneer. The …rst new route we have explored consists in imposing Cournot conjectures in the price-setting game, which also reproduces Kreps and Scheinkman's (1983) result in a single-stage model. The second route amounts to impose ex post market-clearing in the game where …rms compete in (linear) supply functions. All of this holds true irrespective of the degree of product di¤erentiation.
